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I. INTRODUCTION
"Excuuuuuse me, you're parked in my slot. "
AMID CONTINUING SKEPTICISM of its role as ombudsman
L f the satellite telecommunications industry,2 the Interna-
tional Telecommunications Union (ITU) 3 stands at the begin-
ning of its greatest challenge yet: whether it can withstand the
paper satellite storm and satisfy all of its constituents at the same
time.4 The paper satellite problem refers to the gigantic
I Delbert D. Smith, Panel Discussion at the Nineteenth Annual Satellite Com-
munications Expo & Conference: Excuse Me. You're Parked in My Spot (Sept. 18,
1997) (on file with author) (describing the new era of non-cooperation between
administrations brought about by the paper satellite crisis).
2 See Vineeta Shetty, ITU in Mid-Flutter, COMM. INT'L, Nov. 1994, at 5. Global
privatization of the telecommunications industry has left the role of the Interna-
tional Telecommunication Union (ITU) in question. See id. As state owned ad-
ministrations have changed roles from operator to regulator, "new technologies
have given rise to new operators." Id. Arrangements negotiated between the op-
erators have replaced the ITU's inefficient ways of providing international tele-
communications services. See id. In addition, regional organizations have
essentially been duplicating the activities of the ITU. See id. Financial accounta-
bility at the ITU is also beginning to spin out of control. See id. Increased rival-
ries have forced the ITU to deal with its inherently conflicting goals of equitable
access and economic efficiency. See id. As a result, dwindling funds, competing
alternatives, and increased rivalries may lead to the ITU's undoing. See id.; see also
Scott Blake Harris, Complacency Could Kill Off the ITU, COMM. WK. INT'L, Mar. 10,
1997 (discussing the impending challenges faced by the ITU, which could deter-
mine its ultimate credibility in dealing with international telecommunications
issues).
3 SeeJoseph A. Bosco, International Law Regarding Outer Space-An Overview, 55
J. AIR L. & COM. 609 (1990). The ITU is an international telecommunications
agency of the United Nations. See id. at 622. The ITU was founded in 1865 as the
International Telegraph Union to establish regulations for international telegra-
phy; PAMELA L. MEREDITH & GEORGE S. ROBINSON, SPACE LAW: A CASE STUDY FOR
THE PRACTITIONER: IMPLEMENTING A TELECOMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE BUSINESS
CONCEPT 158-79 (1992). The International Telegraph Union changed its name
to the present day International Telecommunications Union in 1932. See id. at
158. In 1959, the ITU embraced space communications. See id. See generally RITA
LAURIA WHITE & HAROLD M. WHITE, JR., THE LAW AND REGULATION OF INTERNA-
TIONAL SPACE COMMUNICATION 30-61 (1988) (discussing the history of the ITU).
4 See Clayton Mowry, Shred the Paper Satellites, SATELLITE COMM., Nov. 1996, at
61. "At the recent Satel Conseil symposium in Paris, France, Pekka Tarjanne,
Director General of the ITU, told the audience that the future of his organization
depended largely on its collective ability to solve the mounting paper satellite
crisis." Id.
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number of applications filed with the ITU Radiocommunication
Bureau (RB) to operate satellite systems at specific locations in
geostationary orbit.5 Abuse of the ITU's "first-come-first-serve"
reservation process has caused congestion in the orbital arc by
satellite system projects that exist on paper but not in reality.6
In fact, many of the architects of these filings know their
projects will never see a launch pad, but they insist on delaying
tangible satellite systems from entering orbit.7
These events culminated at the World Radiocommunications
Conference (WRC-97) 8 during the fall of 1997 in Geneva, Swit-
zerland. Resolution 18, which was adopted by the WRC-95 to
study and recommend possible solutions to the paper satellite
5 See Siegfreid Wiessner, The Public Order of the Geostationary Orbit: Blueprints for
the Future, 9 YALE J. WORLD. PUB. ORD. 217, 218-20 (1983). The geostationary
orbit lies directly above the equator at an altitude of 22,300 miles (35,776 km) in
the sky. See id. at 218; see also Sharon L. Fjordbak, The International Direct Broadcast
Satellite Controversy, 55 J. AIR. L. & COM. 903, 905 n.12 (1990). A satellite posi-
tioned in geostationary orbit provides the most desirable means of relaying tele-
communication signals because the satellite travels at the same speed of the
rotation of the earth. See id. at 905 n.12. Thus, its fixed position in the sky elimi-
nates the need for a land based transmitter to constantly track its location. See id.
Three satellites operating in relay can provide worldwide coverage. See id. See
generally Martin A. Rothblatt, The Impact of International Satellite Communications
Law upon Access to the Geostationary Orbit and the Electromagnetic Spectrum, 16 TEX.
INT'L L. J. 207, 209-10 (1980) (discussing the development of the geostationary
spectrum).
6 Mowry, supra note 4, at 61.
7 See id.
8 See ITU Press Release, WRC 97 to Shape Development of Tomorrow's Radiocom-
munications Environment (October 23, 1997) <http://www.itu.ch/PPI/press/re-
leases/1997/itu-19.html> [hereinafter ITU Press Release]. WRC-97 was held
October 27 through November 21, 1997, in Geneva, Switzerland. See id. The
four week long conference set international regulations for use of radiocom-
munication frequencies by terrestrial and wireless systems and satellite orbital
slots. See id.; Peter B. de Selding, WRC '97 Targets Glut of Paper Satellites, SPACE
NEWS, Oct. 27-Nov. 2, 1997, at 4 [hereinafter Selding, Glut]. The meeting was
composed of 1,600 corporate and government delegates from over 140 countries.
See Selding, Glut at 4. "Once a low-key conference of engineers who spent days
debating issues of little immediate interest to the outside world, the WRC gather-
ings have become high-stakes events featuring spare-no-expense corporate lobby-
ing and political arm twisting." Peter B. de Selding, Spectrum Crunch Sets Stage for
European-U.S. Scuffle, SPACE NEWS, Oct. 27-Nov. 2, 1997, at 4 [hereinafter Selding,
Euro-U.S. Scuffle]; see also Sara Anne Hook, Note, Allocation of the Radio Spectrum:
Is the Sky the Limit?, 3 IND. INT'L & COMP L. REv. 319, 331-33 (1993). WRCs are
international meetings of government and private industry representatives re-
sponsible for making changes to international radio regulations. See Hook at
331. Member nations must adhere to WRC's regulations when formulating their
own domestic regulations. See id. However, in the United States, the Senate must
ratify the WRC's acts before they become binding on this country. See id.
1998]
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problem, was among the many issues considered during the
conference.' The ultimate success of Resolution 18 however will
not come without its share of problems.1" An international sat-
ellite coordination process could still remain elusive so long as
the ITU cannot enforce its own regulations. 1 Worse yet, an in-
adequate four-week debate to try and tackle these issues is not
likely to yield any long term strategy to resolve a problem,
which, by all indications of economic growth, 12 will only
worsen. 13
9 See Gerald E. Oberst, Jr., Resolution 18 Looms, VIA SATELLITE, June 1, 1997, at
20 (discussing a variety of salient issues that must be addressed during WRC-97).
10 See id. The ITU is considering changes to its current satellite coordination
process that will profoundly affect national regulatory structures. See id. The
FCC will have to make significant changes to its own procedures. See id.
Although the FCC has granted numerous waivers of deadlines, international
deadlines could frustrate its efforts in the future to grant additional waivers. See
id. New deadlines could also force countries, like the United States, with com-
plex regulatory structures to shorten its own deadline in order to meet compli-
ance. See id. Moreover, the ITU would thrust itself into a regulator role in which
it has not acted as in the past. See id.
1I See infra notes 22-31 and accompanying text.
12 See TimothyJ. Logue, Opening Doors Around the World, SATELLITE TELECOMMU-
NICATIONS, Aug. 1996, at 31. The satellite industry is in one of the most dynamic
growth stages in history. See id. In developed countries, Global Positioning Sys-
tem technology and direct broadcasting satellite services are reaching more peo-
ple than ever before. See id. In developing countries, the demand for satellites is
growing at an exponential rate because of the lack of terrestrial infrastructure
costs. See id. The next generation of satellite systems, low and medium earth
orbitting, will bring internet access to business and consumers alike. See id.; see
also TimothyJ. Logue, Expansion in the Skies, ASIA-PACIFIC SATELLITE (Dec. 1996)
<http://www.coudert.com/expan.html> [hereinafter Logue, Expansion]. The
five year satellite boom shows no signs of abating. See id. The economic boom in
Asia is fueling the boom in satellite services. See id. Several countries are plan-
ning to develop their own regional commercial satellite ventures. See id.
13 SeeJames M. Gifford, The WRC to End all WRCs, SATELLITE COM.,July 1997, at
6. The WRC is not an efficient forum in which to address radio spectrum policy.
See id. Each year, crucial decisions are deferred for review at the next WRC. See
id. When WRC-95 was completed, teams were already being assembled for WRC-
97. See id. A major reason for the delay is that each and every nation is allowed
an equal vote and opportunity to be heard. See id. Micromanagement of every
minute issue is therefore likely to occur before any result is reached. See id. Com-
mercial satellite ventures will ultimately suffer from this delay when told to return
to Geneva in 24 months for another slim chance at a decision. See id. As a result,
gathering the world's delegates every two years is a weak strategy to solve today's
satellite problems. See id.; see also Scott Blake Harris, A Preview of WRC-97, SATEL-
LITE COM., May 1997, at 18 ("If you think that sounds like a lot to tackle in four
weeks, you're right. And as various administrations finalize their proposals over
the next several months, the issues are only likely to multiply.").
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This Comment will review Resolution 18's attempt to create a
viable international satellite coordination system that will pro-
vide equitable access to all countries, as well as encourage eco-
nomic efficiency. Part I will provide a legal and institutional
understanding as to why current international treaties and ad-
ministrative agencies have failed to take into account the prob-
lem of paper satellites. Part II will characterize the economic
factors that have contributed to the crisis that exists today. Part
III will explain why the ITU's current procedure is incapable of
handling the problem of paper satellites. Furthermore, Part IV
will look specifically at the recommendations made by Resolu-
tion 18 and discuss some problems with the implementation of
those recommendations. Finally, Part V argues that, in order for
a long term solution to exist, the private satellite industry must
play a crucial role in solving the paper satellite problem.
II. THE LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL
CONTEXT UNRAVELED
A. THE TONGAN SURPRISE
When the tiny island-nation of Tonga filed for the remaining
sixteen orbital slots that link Asia with the United States,14 the
international community became exasperated that such a tiny
country was abusing the ITU's first come-first serve proce-
dures. 5 Even worse, Tonga made no secret of the fact that it
intended to sell some of the highly lucrative orbital positions it
acquired to other speculators.16 "Tonga [was] acting on behalf
of Friendly Islands Satellite Communications, Ltd. (Ton-
gasat)."'7 Industry giant INTELSAT 18 immediately claimed that
the number of positions sought by Tonga greatly exceeded its
14 See Edmund L. Andrews, Tiny Tonga Seeks Satellite Empire in Space, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 28, 1990, at Al ("The island nation of Tonga has seized on a loophole in
international law to lay claim to the last 16 desirable unoccupied orbital parking
spaces for satellites that can link Asia, the Pacific and the United States."). See
generally Albert N. Delzeit & Robert F. Beal, The Vulnerability of the Pacific Rim
Orbital Spectrum under International Space Law, 9 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 69 (1996) (ex-
posing the disadvantages of the current ITU system).
15 SeeJonathan Ira Ezor, Costs Overhead: Tonga's Claiming of Sixteen Geostationary
Orbital Sites and the Implications for U.S. Space Policy, 24 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 915,
916 (1993). Despite having no space program or military aviation programs of
any kind, Tonga attempted to claim 8.9% of the 180 geostationary positions avail-
able. See id.
16 See Andrews, infra note 20, at C33 (discussing the possibility of Tonga charg-
ing $2 million per year for each orbital slot).
17 MEREDITH & ROBINSON, supra note 3, at 167.
1998] 853
854 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [63
needs and that approving Tonga's plans would reduce the ITU
registration process into nothing more than an opportunity for
financial speculation.1 9 Tonga eventually saved the ITU from
international embarrassment by withdrawing ten applications
for orbital positions and announcing that its requirements could
be met with just six satellite slots.2" Despite this "generous" can-
cellation by Tonga, its actions exposed the existing legal and
institutional weaknesses of the coordination process and imme-
diately spurred the international community into debate con-
cerning the paper satellite crisis.21
is See Agreement Relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite
Organization, Aug. 20, 1971, art. III(a), 23 U.S.T. 3813, 3819, (entered into force
Feb. 12, 1973) [hereinafter INTELSAT Agreement]. INTELSAT was established
by international treaty in 1964 by the United States and ten other countries. See
INTELSAT WWW Home Page, <http://www.intelsat.int>. INTELSAT owns and
operates the world's largest commercial fleet of satellites. See id. It relies heavily
upon Pacific geostationary locations to continue its global service. See id. At the
end of 1997, there were over 140 member countries to the INTELSAT Operating
Agreement. See id. Each country shares an ownership interest in INTELSAT,
which varies depending upon their use of INTELSAT services. See id.; see also
GLENN H. REYNOLDS & ROBERT P. MERGES, OUTER SPACE: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND
POLICY 202-04 (1989). Although established by international treaty, INTELSAT is
a commercial venture intended to make a minimum 14% return each year for its
shareholders. See id.
19 See INTELSAT Moves to Stop Tongasat's Trade in Orbital Slots, COM. DAILY, Aug.
3, 1990, at 3. INTELSAT requests longer term changes in ITU regulations to
prevent Tongasat and others with the same plan from controlling unnecessary
satellite spots. See id.; Milton L. Smith, Legal and Policy Developments in International
Satellite Communication, 34 PROC. COLLOQ. L. OUTER SPACE 342, 345 (1992) (dis-
cussing Tongasat's efforts to manipulate the ITU regulations for economic
growth); see generally Francis Lyall, The International Telecommunications Union and
Development, 22J. SPACE L. 23, 30-31 (1994) (arguing that Tongasat's actions were
perversion of ITU rules and that protecting such claims would result in non-
compliance of other ITU rules); MEREDITH & ROBINSON, supra note 3, at 168 (dis-
cussing how Tongasat's actions may be viewed as a violation of the spirit of the
ITU Convention and Radio Regulations).
20 See Edmund L. Andrews, Tonga's Plan for Satellites Set Back by Global Agency,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1990, at C33. A letter from the ITU in response to the Tonga
situation implied the International Frequency Regulation Board (IFRB) would
cancel all of Tonga's claims to satellite slots if it refused to limit its claims by a
January 1 deadline. See id.; see also MEREDITH & ROBINSON, supra note 3, at 167-69.
INTELSAT's protests were submitted to the ITU by the FCC. See id. As a conse-
quence, the IFRB yielded to the pressure by INTELSAT and caused Tongasat to
reduce its filings from sixteen to six. See id.
21 See SATELLITE WK., March 18, 1996, available in 1996 WL 7054518 (noting
that although Tonga has reduced its applications, it still plans to lease its remain-
ing two orbital positions); see also U.S. Satellite Operators Unwavering Opposition to
Tonga, SATELLrIE WK., Nov. 15, 1993, available in 1993 WL 2609991; Ezor, supra
note 15, at 916 (stating the importance of the Tonga situation is the balance
between a developing country's need for telecommunications technology and a
1998] PAPER SATELLITE PROBLEM 855
B. THE INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS UNION
The primary obstacle for the satellite community is that the
ITU cannot enforce its own regulations.12 Under current ITU
practice, the use of the spectrum/orbit resource is based pri-
marily on goodwill and cooperation between member nations
(also referred to as "administrations"). 21 While the ITU Con-
vention is the constitution of the ITU, the Radio Regulations
regulate frequency and orbital uses.24 Although both regimes
have the force of international treaties, countries often make
reservations or exceptions to particular aspects of ITU agree-
ments or proceedings. 2 This practice prevents absolute en-
modern nation's ability to provide economies of scale). The resolution of the
Tonga question will affect the international telecommunications arena long after
the Tonga situation. See id.; ITU Needs Way to Separate "Paper" Systems from Real
Satellites, MOBILE SATELLITE REP., Dec. 19, 1994 (describing most of the ITU fil-
ings for advance registration as "speculative requests" for "paper satellite
systems").
22 See Jacqueline M. Smith, Acceptance of Prior Consent as a Means of Regulating
Direct Broadcast Satellites, 3 EMORYJ. INT'L Disp. RESOL. 99, 108 (1988) (" [A] 11 states
are free to use outer space without seeking permission from other states or from
any international organization. This use includes the right to put communica-
tions satellites into orbit or operate them without asking the permission of an-
other government.") (citing Council of Europe, Mass Media Files No. 8,
Television by Cable and Satellite at 20 (1985)).
23 See Rothblatt, supra note 5, at 213. Although not required to do so, "mem-
ber states unanimously obey the regulations because they recognize the necessity
for all national networks to be interconnectable and interoperable." Id.
24 See International Telecommunications Convention, Oct. 25, 1973, art. 10,
para. 1, 28 U.S.T. 2497, (entered into force Jan. 1, 1984) [hereinafter ITU Con-
vention]. The ITU convention was enacted in 1984 by the United Nations. See id.
The ITU is organized into four governmental bodies: (i) the General Secretariat,
(ii) the International Frequency Regulation Board [hereinafter IFRB], (iii) the
International Radio Consultative Committee, and (iv) the International Tele-
graph and Telephone Consultative Committee. See id. at 2513. The IFRB is a
five-member committee elected by the Plenipotentiary Conference. See id. at
2518. The IFRB is charged with coordination and assignment of satellite loca-
tions in the International Frequency Registration. See id. at 2513-18; see also Lou
Manuta, Orbital Contention: International Telecommunications Union Assigns Orbital
Slots Rules for Geosynchronous Satellites, SATELLITE COMM., Jan. 1994, at 32 (The
IFRB changed its name to the Radiocommunications Bureau (hereinafter "RB")
in 1993 during restructuring of the ITU); JAN SMITs, LEGAL ASPECTS OF IMPLE-
MENTING INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS 77-78 (1991). The Radio Regula-
tions "define the conditions for harmonious use of the radio spectrum by all
countries in order to prevent chaos." Manuta at 32.
25 See Hook, supra note 8, at 332. In the United States, the Senate must ratify
any ITU Acts before they become binding on this country. See id. at 331.
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forcement while also protecting national sovereignty among the
member nations. 26
The WRC meetings are held every two years in Geneva, where
members decide on issues regarding spectrum and orbit alloca-
tion. 2 ' Although resolutions adopted at the WRC are generally
complied with, the ITU has no power to enforce any of its trea-
ties.28 Furthermore, the ITU's two major aims when determin-
ing spectrum allocation are equitable access for all countries
and efficient use of a limited resource. 29 In always trying to si-
multaneously balance these inherently conflicting goals, the
ITU often finds itself unprepared to deal with the interests of a
small country needing equitable access and a larger country able
to provide efficient use of the orbital slot.0 Consequently, the
ITU is ill-equipped to deal with the paper satellite problem be-
cause of its conflicting goals and lack of muscle."
C. THE OUTER SPACE TREATY OF 1967
International treaties cannot properly address the problem of
paper satellites either. The world's threshold source of interna-
tional space law, the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 (Outer Space
21 See Brian E. Harris, The New Telecommunications Development: Bureau of the In-
ternational Telecommunication Union, 7 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 83, 85 (1991).
Sovereignty preserves a country's national right to regulations of its telecommu-
nications industry. See id.
27 See ITU Press Release, supra note 8, at <http://www.itu.int/newsroom/
press/releases/ 1997/itu-19.html>.
28 See Stephen A. Levy, Institutional Perspectives on the Allocation of Space Orbital
Resources: The ITU, Common User Satellite Systems and Beyond, 16 CASE W. RES. J.
INT'L L. 171, 186 (1984). Although RB is formally in charge of regulating coordi-
nation activities of member states, it has no real enforcement power or actual
control over how a member uses its orbital assignments. See id.; DAVID M. LEIVE,
INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAw: THE REGULA-
TION OF THE RADIO SPECTRUM 22 n.8 (1970). The RB cannot order satellite oper-
ators to stop transmission nor deny assignment requests. See id.
29 See Martin A. Rothblatt, ITU Regulation of Satellite Communication, 19 STAN. J.
INT'L L. 1, 7 (1982). "The two basic principles which guide modern international
regulation of space telecommunications are efficient use and equitable sharing
of space service frequencies and the geostationary orbit." See id.
30 Seejannat C. Thompson, Comment, Space for Rent: The International Telecom-
munications Union, Space Law, and Orbit/Spectrum Leasing, 62J. AIR L. & COM. 279,
285 (1996). Since many states have no need for a satellite system, conferring
orbital locations to these developing nations would waste this scarce resource and
impair overall efficiency. See id. However, this view must be balanced against a
developing country's need for telecommunications services. See id. As a result,
there is "ongoing tension between the goals of a fair and equitable system of
allocation and the efficient use of a finite resource." Id.
1 See id. at 286.
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Treaty),32 was signed at a time when people thought of the spec-
trum as an unlimited resource. 3 At the time, no one could ac-
curately contemplate its potential financial benefit. 4 Many
argue that this Treaty should apply to spectrum allocation 35
based upon the principles of "common heritage of mankind 36
32 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, opened
for signature Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 (entered into force
for the United States on Oct. 10, 1967) [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty]; see also
MILTON L. SMITH, INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATION 194
(1990). The United Nations adopted this treaty on December 16, 1966, through
the recommendation of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. See
id.; see also Vladimir Kopal, Evolution of the Main Principles of Space Law in the Institu-
tional Framework of the United Nations, 12 J. SPACE L. 12, 13 (1984) (discussing the
function and recommendation process of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space); See WHITE & WHITE, supra note 3, at 242. The adoption of the
Outer Space Treaty by the United Nations formally extended the applicability of
international law to activities in outer space. See id. See generally CARL Q. CHRIS-
TOL, THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OUTER SPACE 444 (1982) (discussing
the Outer Space Treaty and its applicability to outer space activities); Bosco, supra
note 3, at 614. "This treaty is known as the basic treaty from which all others
arose because many of the broad principles set forth in this treaty are the basis
for subsequent treaties." Id.
33 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 32, art. I. Article I states that "[t]he ex-
ploration and use of outer space ... shall be carried out for the benefit and in
the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific
development, and shall be the province of all mankind." Id.
34 See id. Article I of the Outer Space Treaty states that the geostationary orbit
is "the province of all mankind" and "free for exploration and use by all states."
Id.
35 See Rothblatt, supra note 29, at 19. The principles of common heritage of
mankind may apply to satellite telecommunications since orbital space is a lim-
ited resource and is governed by an existing international agency in the ITU. See
id. In addition, this resource must be protected from interference to benefit
mankind. See id.
36 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celes-
tial Bodies, G.A. Res. 34/68, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 77, U.N.
Doc. A/34/664 (1979) [hereinafter Moon Treaty]. The principle of "common
heritage of mankind" is inherent in the Moon Treaty. See id. However, the Moon
Treaty does not govern geostationary orbit and has not been signed by many
countries including the United States. See id.; see also Rothblatt, supra note 29, at
7. The common heritage of mankind is an expansion of the traditional interna-
tional legal principle of res communes, where scarce resources become available to
all nations in a regulated manner. See id.; see generally Carl Christol, The Common
Heritage of Mankind Provision in the 1979 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 14 INT'L LAw. 429, 451-52 (1980). The goals of
the principle are to protect the environment, conserve the world's resources for
present and future generations, and to provide equitable access to all nations. See
id.
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and "non-appropriation."37 However, attempts to apply this
Treaty to spectrum allocation have met with failure. 8 In fact,
some countries have acted in direct contradiction to its princi-
ples. 39 As a result, administrative and legal solutions have failed
to address the problem of paper satellites.
III. OTHER FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE PAPER
SATELLITE PROBLEM
A. THE GOLD RUSH PHENOMENON
Despite the lack of available institutional and legal remedies
for addressing paper satellites, there are still other factors that
have contributed to the gold rush mentality that exists today.4"
First, as market needs and demands have increased,4 a host of
37 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 32, art. II. Article II of the Outer Space
Treaty of 1967 states that the geostationary orbit is "not subject to national appro-
priation by claim of sovereignty, by means of occupation, or by any other means."
Id.; see also Milton L. Smith, The Role of the ITU in the Development of Space Law,
XVII-I ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 157, 165 (1992) (discussing why appropriation of
sovereignty by one State would be inconsistent with the freedom of use by all
nations).
38 See Gennady M. Danilenko, The Concept of the "Common Heritage of Mankind"
in International Law, XIII ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 247, 262-63 (1988). The ITU has
rejected this principle and instead regulates spectrum allocation through WRC
meetings. See id.
39 See Declaration of the First Meeting of Equatorial Countries (Dec. 3, 1976), re-
printed in SPACE LAW: BAsic LEGAL DOCUMENTS B IV (Karl-Heinz B6chstiegel &
Marietta Benk6 eds., 1990). The Bogota Declaration was signed by eight equato-
rial nations that asserted sovereignty over portions of the geostationary orbit di-
rectly over their respective territories. See id. Only the countries of Columbia,
Ecuador, Indonesia, and Kenya have since maintained the stance advanced in the
Bogota Declaration. See id.; see also Michael J. Finch, Note, Limited Space: Allocat-
ing the Geostationary Orbit, 7 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 788, 790 (1986). Despite the
limited number of countries still holding this view, the Bogota Declaration has
been rejected by every other ITU member as violating the "non-appropriation"
principle. See id.
40 See ITU Still Awash in Paper Filings, LEO Constellations Adding Confusion, SPACE
Bus. NEWS (Oct. 30, 1996), available in LEXIS, Market Library, IACNEWS File
("The growth in filings is due to a gold rush mentality on the part of countries,
. ....") [hereinafter ITUStillAwash]; see also Lyall, supra note 19, at 30 (describing
Tongasat's actions as "stak[ing] a claim like that of a prospector of old").
41 See Theresa Foley, Pie in the Sky?, COMM. WK. INT'L, Dec. 16, 1996 ("A recent
report from New York investment bank Bear Stearns & Co. predicts that today's
$9 billion communications satellite business will triple in value to $29 billion by
2000 ..." (citations omitted); Timothy J. Logue, The Satellite Boom Continues over
Asia, ASIAN COMM., Aug. 1996, <http://www.coudert.com/sateasia.html> [here-
inafter Logue, Boom]. Booming growth and rapid diversification continues in the
Asia/Pacific region satellite telecommunications industry. See id. It is becoming
increasingly difficult to keep track of the various satellite deals being announced
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countries are rushing to secure orbital positions.4 2 Some coun-
tries cite national or regional needs as the driving force in the
increase of applications.43 Others justify the enormous number
of applications being filed as necessary in order to safeguard
against coordination difficulties and increasing operational flex-
ibility.4" Unfortunately, many countries, recognizing the in-
creasing value of this limited resource, file numerous
applications in order to gain valuable rights that can then be
sold at a premium to other administrations.4 5 Some of these
countries intend to use their prime real estate to entice multina-
tional companies (also referred to as "operators") to build satel-
lite systems. In return, these companies would serve the
regional needs of their country as well as bring in much needed
capital.46
and negotiated with Western spacecraft manufacturers. See id. The major barri-
ers so far have been the availability of orbital locations and frequencies to accom-
modate all the filings. See id.; see also Logue, Expansion, supra note 12, at 2. The
spread of satellites, innovative services, and market need account for a worldwide
explosion in the satellite telecommunications industry. See id. Although the dis-
putes associated with orbital locations appear to have settled down, coordination
and availability of orbital locations remain a significant barrier. See id.
42 See Selding, Glut, supra note 8, at 4. By the end of 1996, approximately 2,200
satellite networks had been filed with the ITU's RB. See id. So far in 1997, over
1,500 more networks were filed. See id. Before 1994, filings averaged about 100
per year. See ITU Still Awash, supra note 40. Thereafter, the ITU continues to be
notified of 500-600 new applications each year. See id.; see also Mowry, supra note
4, at 61 ("Applications filed with the ITU for slots over Asia are now eight times
greater than the number of existing slots.").
43 See Logue, Expansion, supra note 12, at 2. Singapore and Taiwan have re-
centlyjoined Japan, South Korea, China, Hong Kong, Australia, Thailand, Malay-
sia, India, and Indonesia with operational satellites. See id. Moreover, the nations
of Laos and the Philippines have satellite projects underway to meet their re-
gional needs. See id.; Logue, Boom, supra note 41, at 1. The boom in Asia has
contributed to a host of countries rushing to secure internal communication
needs for its country. See id.
44 See Satellite Failure Highlights INTELSAT's Need for Operational Flexibility, SATEL-
LITE WK., Sept. 22, 1997, at 2 [hereinafter Satellite Failure]. Milenko Stojkovic,
INTELSAT's Director of Regulatory Affairs, explained the need to retain paper
satellites in order to hedge against satellite failure. See id. On September 11,
1997, one of INTELSAT's satellites, INTELSAT 605, failed in orbit. See id. Conse-
quently, INTELSAT immediately replaced it with INTELSAT 603. See id. Without
"spare" slots, INTELSAT's service would be interrupted. See id.; see also SMITS,
supra note 24, at 7. Over 2/3 of the world communications end users rely on
INTELSAT to provide continuing and uninterrupted service. See, Satellite Failure,
supra.
45 See infra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
46 See Theresa Foley, Loral Pact Spotlights 'Paper Satellite'Deals, COMM. WK. INT'L,
Feb. 3, 1997, available in LEXIS, Market Library, PROMT File, at 1. Loral Space
& Communications Ltd. has come to terms with the island-nation of Papua New
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B. LACK OF ITU RESOURCES
These factors have ultimately caused an overfilling of applica-
tions that requires an increased number of coordinations be-
tween administrations.47 Since orbital positions are designated
on a first-come-first-serve basis, later applicants must coordinate
with prior applicants in establishing its satellite systems.48 The
result is the increase in number of coordinations between ad-
ministrations with paper systems that will never exist.49
Not surprisingly, the enormous backlog of applicants has
placed tremendous pressure on the ITU to process each filing
and give each its due consideration.5 ° There has been a dra-
matic increase in the last several years in the workload associ-
ated with space services.51 But, the ITU does not possess the
Guinea to utilize three of its orbital slots. See id. This deal allows Loral to launch
into the consumer satellite telecommunications industry while decreasing its lan-
guishing defense oriented segment. See id. For Papua New Guinea, the govern-
ment has negotiated capacity requirements in the new system to meet its internal
communications needs, to transfer expertise to its own citizens, and to increase
business related benefits. See id.; see alsoJorn Christensen, in Panel Discussion,
supra note 1 (discussing General Electric Corp.'s deal with the island-nation of
Gibralter for 12 of its orbital slots in return for regional coverage and creation of
jobs in Gibralter).
47 See Milenko Stodjkovic, in Panel Discussion, supra note 1. More and more,
legitimate systems are being forced to coordinate with paper systems. See id. This
process creates a problem since pure paper satellites do not have any real techni-
cal parameters to prevent against interference. See id. The technical parameters
are crucial to successful coordination between the operators. See id. Conse-
quently, coordination is difficult when the paper system operator does not even
know what his system looks like. See id. In cases where an administration is
merely speculating about its rights, it does not care about coordination. See id.
48 See id.; see also SMITH, supra note 32, at 158 (describing the complete process
of coordination).
4) See Stodjkovic, supra note 47.
50 See Director, Radiocommunications Bureau, Final Report on Resolution 18 of
The Plenipotentiary Conference Kyoto, 1994, at 21, <http://www.itu.int/itudisc/itu-r/
resl8/wrc-97/39465.html> [hereinafter Final Report].
The size and complexity of the individual filings, their large
number plus the Bureau's obligation to conduct regulatory and
technical examinations, results in a huge paper flow, with more
than 50% of the filings requiring correspondence between the ad-
ministration and the Bureau before they can be considered com-
plete. This great volume of correspondence is also due to the fact
that the quality of such submissions is deteriorating.
Id.
51 See id. at 3. At the end of 1996, close to 2200 applications by 62 different
administrations were undergoing the current Radiocommunication Bureau's
procedure to gain orbital locations. See id. The submission rate as well as the
time required to review each submission has been increasing dramatically. See id.
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adequate resources to handle such a load.5 2 The resulting effect
is severe publication delays for everyone, and even worse, ineffi-
cient delays for real satellite systems.53
C. INCREASED RIVALRIES BETWEEN ADMINISTRATIONS
These delays are forcing some administrations to ignore the
coordination process completely and proceed with launches
without adhering to ITU guidelines. 54 In addition, other satel-
lites are being repositioned without the consent of neighboring
administrations.55 These events have caused several conflicts to
develop between countries.5 6 For example, when a Hong Kong
company moved its satellite to 134 degrees east, a dispute
erupted between that company and an Indonesian company
52 See id. at 4. While the number of applications has grown about 440% in the
past four years, staff resources to deal with this increase have only grown approxi-
mately 57%. See id.
53 See id. at 21. Unacceptable processing and publication delays have occurred
as a result of the growing submission rate. See id. Presently, publication of coor-
dination requests occur only after 18 months of submission. See id. Advance
technical information on the satellites is published only seven to eight months
after receipt. See id. Despite these grim statistics, the Radiocommunications Bu-
reau ("RB") has taken some action to remedy this situation. See id. at 22.
Through staff increases and improvements in data entry and electronic process-
ing, there have been slight decreases in delay. See id. However, due to existing
backlogs and delay of actual use of the new information system, the RB admits
real benefits will not be seen for quite some time. See id.
54 See id. at 5. The Final Report recognizes that there is a growing concern
about satellites launched before the coordination process has been completed.
See id. In extreme cases, some systems have been launched even before initiation.
See id. However, some of these minor cases of technological modification may be
justifiable since the coordination process takes so long. See id. In some other
cases, though, competition between operators are causing this non-adherence to
ITU guidelines. See id.
5 See David M. Leive, Rapporteur, Special Committee on Regulatory/Procedural
Matters Devoted to Resolution 18 (Kyoto, 1994) Rapporteur Group SC-4, Report to the
Special Committee, Doc. SC-RG4/54, Nov. 25, 1996, at 27, <http://www.itu.ch/
home/Search> [hereinafter Special Report]. The Special Report address five cases
of uncoordinated uses of the spectrum: (i) uncoordinated use of orbit/spectrum
resources, (ii) satellite networks brought into use without initiating coordination,
(iii) coordination commenced but not concluded prior to use, (iv) failure to
coordinate in urgent cases, and (v) transfer of orbit/spectrum resources within
and between administrations. See id.
56 See Richard McCaffery, Crowded Orbital Slots Test ITU's Influence, SPACE NEWS,
Jan. 27-Feb. 2, 1997, available in LEXIS, Market Library, PROMT File, at 3 ("The
situation in Asia is 'right to the brink of overload."'). In the event of a problem
like one satellite interfering with another, the ITU can only investigate the matter
and recommend a solution if asked by the parties. See id. Indonesian satellite
operator Satlindo states that its satellites receive interference about 12 times a
year, a number which has been growing steadily. See id. at 35.
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that claimed rights to that orbital slot.57 In an act of defiance,
the Indonesian operator jammed the signal to the Hong Kong
Apstar 1A satellite.58 Although the Hong Kong operator has
since tilted its antenna angle to prevent the jamming, the situa-
tion is by no means resolved.59
Growing tension is not isolated to the lucrative Pacific Region
either."6 A dispute between a Luxembourg-based company and
the European International Satellite Organization (Eutelsat)
over a precious orbital slot covering all of the German and
French speaking areas of Europe has been stirring for some
time." In 1994, BSkyB of Luxembourg filed an application with
the ITU to transmit from twenty-nine degrees east.12 More than
three years later, the ITU has yet to grant rights to BSkyB be-
cause Eutelsat is claiming the same slot location.63 Nonetheless,
the Eutelsat application is believed by many industry experts to
be nothing more than a paper satellite, with its only purpose to
prevent other operators from transmitting nearby. 6 4 Eutelsat ex-
acerbated the situation when it positioned its newly launched
Hot Bird 2 satellite in the contested slot and began test transmis-
sions-all executed while under the passive eyes of the ITU!"5
IV. CURRENT PROCEDURE
A. BACKGROUND
Among those factors that have given rise to the paper satellite
problem, the most significant is that the current procedure for
planning and coordinating satellite networks is defective in
many ways."" The current procedure was developed during the
1960s when the conventional view was that spectrum resources
were virtually unlimited."7 As a result, the procedure did not
account for the many problems associated with today's paper
satellites."8 There are three phases an administration must com-
57 See id. at 3.
58 See id.
59 See id. at 35.
60 See Matthew Leigh, Connected: The Space War is on a Dispute over Satellite Slots






66 See Stodjkovic, supra note 47.
67 See id.; see also infra notes 86-107 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 86-107 and accompanying text.
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ply with in order to gain rights to an orbital position: advance
publication, coordination, and notification.69
The Radiocommunications Bureau (RB) administers the allo-
cation and coordination of spectrum as determined during the
WRC.7 ° When an operator desires an orbital slot, it contacts its
respective ITU member administration. 71 Thus, in the United
States operators contact the FCC, which in turn formally submits
a request on behalf of the operator to the RB. 72 Some state-
owned telecommunications operators also serve as the notifying
administration to the ITU. 73 The request must contain informa-
tion regarding the technical characteristics of the proposed sat-
ellite system in order to coordinate with existing satellites in a
nearby location. 4 This information is then submitted to the RB,
as early as nine years before beginning service, for publication
in its weekly bulletin.75
The purpose of advance publication is to allow other satellite
operators the chance to review potential technical interference
with their own transmissions and to allow sufficient time for all
parties to coordinate and resolve such disputes.7 6 In some dis-
putes, the Radio Regulations Board (RRB) 77 will facilitate nego-
tiations between the parties until they reach a satisfactory
compromise.78 Coordination is the most important phase be-
cause an operator does not acquire any rights in the ITU pro-
cess until it submits a coordination request.79 Later, applicants
who submit coordination requests must adhere to a prior appli-
cant's requirements. 80 Thus, in all cases, operators desiring a
- See Manuta, supra note 24, at 32.
70 See id.
71 See MEREDIrrH & ROBINSON, supra note 3, at 169. International Organiza-
tions, like INTELSAT, and other domestic operators cannot be members of the
ITU. See id. Only nations are allowed membership. See id. As a result, INTEL-
SAT's protests against Tongasat were submitted to the ITU by the FCC. See id.
72 See id.
73 See id.
74 See Manuta, supra note 24, at 32.
75 See SMITH, supra note 32, at 158.
76 See Stodjkovic, supra note 47.
77 See Final Report, supra note 50, at 10. The RRB regulates and sets technical
standards for satellites. See id.
78 See SMITH, supra note 32, at 158. But the ITU may only investigate if re-
quested to do so by both parties. See id. Even then, it can only recommend solu-
tions which both parties may or may not abide by. See id.
79 See Stodjkovic, supra note 47.
80 See id.
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license have up to nine years to coordinate once their coordina-
tion request is submitted.8
Once the coordination process is completed and technical in-
terference is mitigated to the satisfaction of each party involved,
the hopeful satellite operator notifies the RB.82 During notifica-
tion, the RB will confirm that there are no technical obstacles
left to be resolved and register the allocated spectrum in its
Master Register.8 3 Proper registration guarantees the operator a
vested interest in the assigned slot subject only to the life of the
operator itself.84 Thus, once an orbital assignment is made, an
operator may continue to launch satellites into that position as
existing satellites become inoperable. 5
B. PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT PROCEDURE
Problematic features of the current registration process have
resulted in a paper satellite crisis.8 6 First, the current procedure
allows a satellite operator six years plus an automatic three year
renewal,8 for a total of nine years, to actually launch a satellite
into orbit.88 In earlier years, when satellite monopolies domi-
nated the marketplace, there was no need to limit the number
of years to launch a satellite. 9 In contrast, today's deregulation
of telecommunication companies around the globe has caused
"speculative filings and . . . slot hoarding" to become industry
norms.90 Consequently, this nine-year time frame allows paper
81 See id.
82 See id.
83 See SMITS, supra note 24, at 83.
84 See Manuta, supra note 24, at 33.
85 See Stodjkovic, supra note 47. But replacement satellites must have the exact
technical characteristics as the ones they are replacing so as not to unduly inter-
fere with nearby satellites. See id. But see Peter Matshan, in Panel Discussion,
supra note 1 (arguing that orbital assignments be limited to specific regulatory
lives at the end of which open bidding in a competitive market determines who
owns the rights).
86 See Matshan, supra note 85.
87 See Final Report, supra note 50, at 7. Under Radio Regulation (RR) 1042, a six
year period is authorized to bring a satellite into operation. See id. Under RR
1550, a three year extension is granted upon request. See id.
88 See Selding, Glut, supra note 8, at 4. Until the mid-1980s, applications were
allowed 6.5 years to launch without a chance to renew. See id. But following
several failures that delayed satellite launches, the ITU extended this term to the
present nine years. See id.




satellites to develop at the expense of real systems awaiting
clearance.91
Second, there are no meaningful financial incentives to avoid
unrealistic filings.92 It costs nothing to initiate the filing other
than the minimal cost of preparing paperwork to submit to the
ITU.93 This cost is meaningless when compared with the incred-
ible potential of acquiring rights to a specific orbit location.94
Furthermore, there are no penalties or sanctions charged
against an operator if its proposed system never gets off the
ground.95 In fact, many administrations submit multiple filings
even though they intend to launch only one satellite. 96 As a re-
sult, there are virtually no financial costs or risks to deter an
operator from issuing paper satellites. 9
Moreover, there are no requirements to prove intent once the
current procedure is initiated.9" Under the existing procedure,
the satellite operator does not have to report its progress to the
ITU. 99 In fact, the satellite operator can choose not to coordi-
nate at all with neighboring systems once the coordination re-
quest has been submitted.1 °° Many applications have one sole
purpose: reservation of capacity without actual use.1 'a In these
cases, contracts have not even been negotiated for manufactur-
ing and launching of the proposed satellites.10 2
91 See id. In some cases, "the time it takes to file for and coordinate honest-to-
goodness satellite applications from companies with the wherewithal to actually
build and launch the birds, has . .. quadrupled." Id.
92 See Special Report, supra note 55, at 10.
93 See id.
94 See supra text accompanying note 12.
95 See Special Report, supra note 55, at 10.
96 See Final Report, supra note 50, at 9. Currently, administrations can file an
unlimited number of applications although they intend to only launch one satel-
lite. See id. This adds to the complexity of coordination and makes it impossible
to complete in extreme cases. See id. However, some administrations will file for
multiple positions because they cannot postulate in advance which orbital loca-
tions they will be able to successfully negotiate into position. See Special Report,
supra note 55, at 29.
97 See Special Report, supra note 55, at 10.
98 See Stodjkovic, supra note 47.
99 See id.
100 See id.
101 See Final Report, supra note 50, at 3. Reservation of capacity without actual
use is basically "slot reservation" or "slot warehousing" for potential future appli-
cations. See id. In some of these cases, slots could be used for future commercial
arrangements or further redistribution in the international market. See id.
102 See Mowry, supra note 4, at 61.
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Finally, the current procedure provides for disputes to be re-
solved between the administrations only.' This system is based
on the ITU's "long-standing practice of cooperation and the
practical resolution of problems.' 01 4 Disputes arising during the
coordination process normally result from technical interfer-
ence that causes substantial financial and operational disrup-
tion.105 Cooperation assumes that it is in the best interest of all
parties to minimize this disruption.10 6 However, an operator
possessing paper satellites has no incentive to cooperate, as it
reserves orbital space for non-operational reasons. 10 7 Conse-
quently, the current procedure does not address dispute resolu-
tion in light of the paper satellite crisis.
V. RESOLUTION 18
A. REDUCING TIME LIMITS
WRC-95 adopted Resolution 18 to look into and recommend
solutions to the paper satellite problem.' 8 In particular, WRC-
95 established a Special Committee on Regulatory and Proce-
dural Matters to adopt a process and timetable in which to sur-
vey the view of the administrations. 0 9 The result from the
various inquiries into the paper satellite problem was a Final Re-
port from the Director of the RB recommending specific actions
to take at WRC-97."10
A major goal of Resolution 18 was to propose procedural
changes to encourage operators to more quickly bring their
103 See Final Report, supra note 50, at 18.
104 Id. In light of the optional dispute settlement procedures already available,
other formal and binding procedures are not required. See id.; see also infra notes
160-67 and accompanying text.
105 See Special Report, supra note 55, at 35.
106 See id.
107 See id. at 16.
108 See id. In 1994, the Plenipotentiary Conference (Kyoto, 1994) adopted Res-
olution 18. See id. Thereafter, at the WRC-95, the assembly established a Special
Committee to review the issues further and prepare a final report for WRC-97.
See id.
109 See id. "Under the chairmanship of Mr. A. Berrada of Morocco, the Special
Committee held its first meeting 28 February-i March, 1996, ... [and] named
two Rapporteurs to prepare, on the basis of [their survey], draft reports to be
considered at the second meeting of the Special Committee in February 1997."
Id.
110 See ITU Press Release, supra note 8. The scope of the conference is deter-
mined at least four years in advance. See id. The ITU Radiocommunication Study
Groups are charged with analyzing each issue for consideration at the confer-
ence. See id.
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satellites into operation.'1 1 Based on the opinions gathered
from the administrations, the current nine-year period was gen-
erally felt to be too long given present technology and industry
wide construction-to-launch schedules.1 2 As a result, the RB's
Final Report recommended the initial period after advance publi-
cation be reduced from six years to five and the extension pe-
riod be reduced by one year, from three to two. 13 Thus, an
operator would have no more than seven years to bring its sys-
tem into operation."14
Nonetheless, some have cast doubt on reducing the time lim-
its." 5 One major area of dispute is what criteria will govern the
two-year extension request." 6 Although the Resolution pro-
vided that an extension should be limited to specific reasons"17
and decided upon within a well-defined procedure," 8 it is un-
likely all the administrations will reach the same conclusions as
to what this means. Moreover, because possible extensions will
have far-reaching policy implications as to whom and when a
request is granted, the RB would effectively be transformed into
an adjudicating arm" 9 of the ITU-a result that has already met
significant resistance from the administrations. °2 Next, given
111 See Final Report, supra note 50, at 10.
112 See id. While noting that reducing this period would not by itself eliminate
paper satellites, the report concluded that a shorter period may persuade opera-
tors to be more realistic. See id. Furthermore, the granting of any extensions





116 See Special Report, supra note 55, at 16. The Special Report cites three con-
siderations in determining extensions: (i) what should be the permissible length
of the extension, (ii) what should be the permissible reasons for the extension,
and (iii) who should decide the extension. See id.
117 See Final Report, supra note 50, at 10. The Special Committee recommended
that an extension be granted only under the following conditions: launch fail-
ure, launch delays, delays caused by design problems in the satellite or by modifi-
cations to be agreed upon during coordination, other specific narrow
circumstances to be defined, and force majeure. See id.
118 See id. Most administrations believe the Radio Regulations Board should
develop Rules of Procedure covering the conditions under which an extension
should be granted. See id.
119 See Special Report, supra note 55, at 17. The Special Committee suggested
that the RRB would ultimately decide whether or not an extension would be
allowed and would adopt procedures to facilitate any right of appeal by the ad-
ministration. See id. These Rules of Procedure would be subject to comment
prior to their adoption by the RRB. See id.
120 See Shetty, supra note 2, at 5.
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the vast number of satellites already in the coordination phases,
how these new rules will be implemented and applied to those
satellites is still in question. 21 Finally, some administrations be-
lieve that the current time frame is necessary to bring certain
systems into operation. 2
2
Another means the Final Report recommended for reducing
the time period for bringing satellites into operation was stream-
lining and simplifying the advance publication phase. 12' There
is currently a six-month delay after the submission of a request
for an orbital position before coordination can begin.1 24 While
some administrations favor keeping separate the advance publi-
cation and coordination phases, others favor eliminating the six-
month delay and, instead, advocate combining both phases into
one. 12 Because there was no consensus on this issue, the Final
Report suggests the stages be kept separate, but recommends re-
ducing the information required for submission in the advance
publication stage. 126
B. ADMINISTRATIVE DUE DILIGENCE
The next important objective for Resolution 18 is to propose
administrative and financial due diligence solutions "to discour-
age the reservation of capacity without actual use."'1 27 In effect,
these solutions would require periodic information from the ad-
ministration showing their serious intentions to establish a satel-
121 See Final Report, supra note 50, at 21. The Report recognized the need for
further study into this issue in order to ensure the application of any new rules to
existing paper satellite systems. See id. Accordingly, each network must be ex-
amined in order to avoid any adverse consequences the new rules may have on
systems that are already undergoing the process. See id. A sample model is con-
tained in Annex 3 of the Report to account for this problem. See id.
122 See Oberst, supra note 9, at 20. Administrative due diligence rules placed on
new operators or operators proposing new and innovative service put them at a
serious disadvantage. See id. Most innovative proposals require "more than seven
years to get off the ground." Id. In fact, many of these innovative proposals did
not have manufacture and launch contracts when filed with the FCC. See id.; see
also Chris Bulloch, Russian Satcom: Some Projects are for Real, VIA SATELLITE, March
1997, available in 1997 WL 9255680 (discussing two Russian satellite projects that
began as just paper systems but have now evolved into enterprising endeavors);
Christensen, in Panel Discussion, supra note 1. (stating that all systems began as
paper systems at some time).
123 See Final Report, supra note 50, at 10.
124 See id.
125 See id. at 10-11.
126 See id. at 11.
127 Id. at 6.
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lite system. 128 It is the general consensus that all operators
should submit frequent progress reports on the development
and implementation of their satellite proposals. 29
But administrations disagree whether the reports should be
reviewed for compliance by the respective administration or by
the RB.13° In the former case, the administration would review
the reports and notify the RB immediately when information is
incomplete or missing entirely.' The consequence for failing
to comply would be the satellite network's loss of rights already
acquired through the ITU's first come, first serve policy. In
other words, the network would have to relinquish its rights to
conforming applications submitted at a later date.
1 2
There are other disadvantages to the procedural approach to
due diligence. 33 First, the procedures would presumably be
128 See id.; Special Report, supra note 55, at 19. The Special Committee identified
the following elements in developing a procedural due diligence approach: (i)
what information is submitted, (ii) who submits it and to whom, (iii) when is it
submitted, (iv) what the Radiocommunications Bureau does with such informa-
tion, (v) what happens if such information is not submitted, and (vi) how such
new procedures are related to the coordination process. See id.
129 See id. at 20. The information submitted should be kept to a minimum
necessary to demonstrate intent. See id. The information must be objectively ver-
ifiable by the RB, including how and to what extent the information is verified.
See id. The process must be published. See id. No proprietary or financial infor-
mation not already available in the public domain should be disclosed. See id.
Finally, this information would be required of domestic operators and interna-
tional organizations alike. See id.; see also Final Report, supra note 50, at 6. In fact,
both the Special Committee and the Radio Regulations Board recommended
that administrative due diligence provisions be adopted by the WRC-97 immedi-
ately. See id.
130 See Final Report, supra note 50, at 6.
131 See Special Report, supra note 55, at 21. The Special Committee recom-
mended that the minimum information required should be:
[(i)] the name of the spacecraft manufacturer, [(ii)] the name of
the satellite operator, [(iii)] the date of execution of the contract,
[(iv)] the contractual date of delivery, [(v)] the number of satel-
lites procured, [ (vi)] the operating frequency range and orbital po-
sitions for each such satellite, [(vii)] the name of the launch vehicle
provider, [(viii)] the name of the customer, [(ix)] the date of exe-
cution of a launch vehicle contract, or other evidence of a commit-
ment to procure a launch, [and] [ (x)] the contractual launch date.
Id.
132 See Final Report, supra note 50, at 6-7.
133 See Memorandum from J.A. Shaw, to Participants in Rapporteur Group SC-
4 (June 12, 1996) <http://www.itu.int/itudoc/itu-r/sc/sc96/sc4/contr/
1_32309.html>. Among the advantages of administrative due diligence, cited by
the United Kingdom and Luxembourg are that it: "[ (i)] places responsibility on
the administration responsible for the filing, [(ii)] simple to implement, [(iii)]
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carried out within the administration entirely and, therefore,
not under the scrutiny of interested parties. 34 Next, there may
be some administrations that apply rules more loosely in order
to attract multinational satellite companies to invest in their
country.13 5  Unevenly-applied standards would result in cases
where one administration does not implement procedures with
the same level of diligence as another.13 6 These situations
could, at the least, result in disputes between administrations13 7
and, at worse, encourage total disregard of ITU standards. 138 Fi-
nally, regional and international organizations, like INTELSAT,
are not subject to the national regulations of their respective
administrations. 39 Thus, national administrations like the FCC
would have little control over the activities of INTELSAT and
other transborder organizations. 40
C. FINANCIAL DUE DILIGENCE
The Final Report also recommended three possible financial
due diligence stipulations: (1) a required filing fee to recover
the ITU's costs for processing the application,' 4 ' (2) an annual
registration fee to support on-going costs of ITU administra-
tion, 142 and (3) a deposit system for new networks with all or
part of the deposit refundable when the system enters into ser-
avoids complications inherent in the alternative approach, [(iv)] permits contin-
uous monitoring of progress and allows a more responsive control of paper satel-




137 See infra notes 54-65 and accompanying text.
138 See Final Report, supra note 50, at 5.
139 See Shaw, supra note 133, § 8; see also Final Report, supra note 50, at 17.
Although Intergovernmental Organization Operating Satellite Systems (IOOSSs)
are not subject to the national regulatory procedures of their notifying adminis-
tration, the adopted rules should also apply to the IOOSSs. See id.
140 See MEREDITH & ROBINSON, supra note 3, at 169.
141 See Final Report, supra note 50, at 8. The rationale for the fee is that users of
the RB's services should be required to internalize the cost of its application. See
id. This fee may be fixed or proportionate to the time required by the RB to
process the application. See id. This recommendation parallels the ongoing ef-
forts of Resolution 39, calling for the full recovery of space radiocommunication
services concerning advance publications and requests for coordination or agree-
ment. See id.
142 See id. Two types of registration fees have been proposed: (i) a required
annual registration fee which is payable upon the return of an initial deposit, or
(ii) an annual registration fee without deposit for the time it takes to bring the
proposed satellite into operation. See id.
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vice.14 The idea behind this scheme is to force administrations
to internalize the costs of their filings as well as demonstrate
their financial capability and seriousness to begin operation. 144
However, there are many administrations that believe the de-
posit system is too problematic.145
While the primary proponent of the deposit system is Austra-
lia, 4 6 the United States has remained staunchly against the
idea.'47 In fact, it appears that many countries do not favor a
143 See id. The deposit system would discourage filings for paper satellites be-
cause: (i) a properly designed and calculated deposit system would discourage
excess or speculative filings and (ii) administrations would ensure that funds are
available before submitting applications on behalf of the operator. See id.
144 See Shaw, supra note 133, at *4. The United Kingdom and Luxembourg
have cited the following advantages to a financial approach to due diligence: (i)
filings would be limited to only those with senior management approval, (ii) de-
posits would encourage operators to quickly bring systems into operation to avoid
accrued interest costs, (iii) interest from deposits and fees would provide needed
income to ITU, (iv) the system would force specific technical characteristics to be
defined before filing, (v) it would minimize speculation, and (vi) a filing fee
would be easy to administer. See id.
145 See id. Among the disadvantages cited, United Kingdom and Luxembourg
have concluded that the practicality of agreeing to a certain level fee for filing is
difficult. See id. Next, this system may impose barriers to less developed countries
with limited financial capability. See id. Also, an expansion in ITU power would
lead to a reduction in national sovereignty. See id. This may also dilute the re-
sponsibility and roles of administrations. See id. Each existing application must
be looked at and reviewed. See id. Expansion of ITU's power could cause polit-
ical conflicts with its goal of satisfying all members. See id. Finally, the fees would
not affect major players with market power, and thus may reduce competition.
See id.
146 See Discussion Paper on Fees and Deposits for Satellite Filings Resolution 18
(Kyoto) (Rapporteur Group of RAG, Rapporteur SC2, (June 12, 1996) <http://
www.itu.int/itudoc/itu-r/rag/rap-rag/rag5/aus/_3231 1. html>. A possible basis
for setting the level of filing deposits could be one percent of the typical cost of a
space station. See id. The typical cost for a space station might be US $250 mil-
lion. See id. Thus, the deposit would be $2.5 million. See id. A Penalty for sys-
tems not brought into use by a certain time would result in only a 50% return of
the deposit. See id.; see also Mowry, supra note 4, at 61. Since Australians have
suffered significantly from the Asia Pacific congestion, they have recommended
huge deposits with accrued interest used to fund the ITU application process. See
id.; ITU Committee Recommends Crumpling Paper Satellites, SATELLITE NEws, (Feb. 10,
1997), available in LEXIS, Market Libray, IACNNS File. (discussing the likeli-
hood of adopting new guidelines for "administrative due process procedures" at
WRC-97). Canada, Norway and Luxembourg are also in favor of a deposit sys-
tem. See id.
147 See United States of America, Comments on SC RG 4 and SC RG 5 Contributions,
Doc. USSC/10-E, July 15, 1996, (last modified Aug. 23, 1996) <http://
www.itu.int/itudoc/itu-r/resl8/rag5/sc-us 10-32658.html> (arguing that fees
and deposits should be implemented as a last resort, only after the failing of
administrative due diligence procedures); see also U.S. Will Seek Administrative
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system in which the ITU is "in charge of monetary enforcement
mechanisms."''I Among other problems with the deposit system
are determining the amounts of deposit and the basis on which
it is determined. 4 9 Other issues include deciding under what
conditions the deposit will be returned and how accrued inter-
est will be handled. 5 ' Although some administrations drafted
proposals to force the issue, the deposit idea was brushed aside
by the time WRC-97 commenced. 5' In fact, the Final Acts of
the WRC-97 12 have specifically recommended against any finan-
cial due diligence in favor of a more gradual administrative due
diligence approach. 15 3
Rather than Financial, SATELLITE WK., Oct. 27, 1997, at 2. The U.S. government
has altogether dismissed the idea and has submitted its own proposal without
including deposits. See id.
148 Mowry, supra note 4, at 61.
14,9 See Final Report, supra note 50, at 8. It has been suggested that the "amount
of the deposit could be calculated at a level sufficient to discourage paper satel-
lites," but not high enough to deter entrepreneurial spirit. Id.
150 See id.
'51 See ITU Members Likely to Defer Decision on Deposits for Satellite Slots, MOBLE
COMM. REP., Feb. 24, 1997, available in LEXIS, Market Library, IACNWS File. An
ITU official stated that "financial methods will require further investigation and
most likely would be deferred." Id. David Leive, Chair of the Special Committee
on Regulatory & Procedural Matters, stated that deposits were off the agenda for
WRC-97, but could be contemplated again at WRC-99. See id.; see also Final Report,
supra note 50, at 9. Many administrations believe that only the ITU Plenipotenti-
ary Conference has the authority to create new fees. See id. Also, many adminis-
trations confessed ignorance on the idea of deposits and indicated they would
need more time to examine the issue. See id.
152 See Administrative Due Diligence Applicable to Some Satellite Communication Serv-
ices, Resolution GTPLEN2-1 (WRC-97), <http://www.itu.ch/search>; see also ITU:
Major Agreements Reached at WIRC 97, M2 PRESSWMRE, Dec. 3, 1997, available in 1997
WL 16294166 (discussing the outcome of Resolution 18 at the WRC-97).
153 See id. "[T]his Conference has decided to reduce the regulatory time-frame
for bringing a satellite network into use, resolves (1) that the administrative due
diligence procedure... shall be applied as from 22 November 1997 for a satellite
network or satellite system . . ." Id.; see also Annex 2 to Resolution GTPLEN2-1
(WRC-97), <http://www.itu.ch/ search>. Administrative Due Diligence will
require disclosure of
(A) Identity of the satellite network: (a) Identity of the satellite
network; (b) Name of the administration; (c) Country symbol; (d)
Reference to the advance publication information or to the request
for modification of the plans; (e) Reference to the request for coor-
dination; (f) Frequency bands; (g) Name of the operator; (h)
Name of the satellite; and (i) Orbital characteristics; (B) Spacecraft
manufacturer: (a) Name of the spacecraft manufacturer; (b) Date
of execution of the contract; (c) Contractual "delivery window;"
and (d) Number of satellites procured; (C) Launch services pro-
vider: (a) Name of the launch vehicle provider; (b) Date of execu-
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D. PROBLEMS WITH IMPLEMENTATION
Without a financial deterrent to file paper satellites, it is un-
likely that administrative due diligence alone will eliminate mul-
tiple filings.154 In view of the current congestion, many
administrations file for more than one orbital position simply to
provide operational flexibility. 155 Thus, operators can hedge
against the need to move satellites from one orbital location to
another in order to achieve optimal operational efficiency.'56
Moreover, extensive networks must include "spare" spaces for
replacement satellites in order to ensure continuity of service to
end users."5 7 Opposing administrations argue that multiple fil-
ings do not give assurances to any pending applications that or-
bital positions will become available once the operator has
fulfilled its need. 5 ' It is unlikely, however, that administrative
due diligence alone will overcome the operators' need for oper-
ational flexibility since huge investments have already been sunk
into development of the network.'59
Resolution 18 also failed to look into whether the ITU's role
should be increased in order to facilitate dispute resolution and
regulatory compliance between administrations. 160 Because the
ITU has traditionally relied on notions of cooperation, it has no
law enforcement power.' 6' Rather, the ITU must rely on the
national regulations of an administration to enforce ITU-recom-
tion of the contract; (c) Anticipated launch or in-orbit delivery
window; (d) Name of the launch vehicle; and (e) Name and loca-
tion of the launch facility.
Id.
54 See Final Report, supra note 50, at 9. One proposal considered by the Special
Committee included requiring applications to indicate specific alternative posi-
tions, where the administration must relinquish the remaining positions once the
satellites have launched. See id. However, many administrations believed this
would encourage more filings by administrations that would normally have only
filed one. See id.
155 See Special Report, supra note 55.
156 See INTELSAT Views on Resolution 18 Issues, (July 17, 1996) <http://
www.itu.int/itudoc/itu-r/resl8/sc4/comments/intelsat_32692.html> [hereinaf-
ter INTELSAT Views]; see also INTELSAT: Comments on Preliminary Report on
Resolution 18 Report, Sept. 30, 1996, Doc. SC-RG4/44 [hereinafter INTELSAT
Comments] (arguing that multiple filings are necessary since its multi-network
system must coordinate a number of different parameters in order to operate at
different combinations).
157 See INTELSAT Views, supra note 156.
158 See Special Report, supra note 55, at 26.
159 See INTELSAT Views, supra note 156.
160 See id. at 18.
161 See id.
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mended provisions. 16 2 But this spread of power between the na-
tions leads to uneven application of international laws. 16 3
Despite this disparity, many administrations favor sovereignty
over increasing the ITU's regulatory power.16 4
Some administrations claim that the "Optional Protocol on
the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes relating to the Constitu-
tion and the Convention of the [ITU] and to the Administrative
Regulations" attached to the ITU Convention already offers par-
ties an opportunity to resolve their differences. 165 However, the
problem with having an optional dispute process is that it is op-
tional and not binding.1 66 Even if both parties agree to this pro-
cess, there are no guarantees that the parties will follow the
ITU's recommendations. 167
In a more symbolic than substantive effort, the Final Report
specifically recommends "[to] empower the ITU to settle dis-
putes arising from unsuccessful satellite coordination exer-
cises. . "68 But even if all coordination disputes were
eradicated, the problem with paper satellites would still exist be-
cause coordination is but one aspect of the problem.169 Accord-
ingly, the power to resolve coordination disputes would not
include the power to enforce administrative due diligence
regulations.171
As a result, it is unlikely that the adopted provisions at WRC-
97 will have any serious effect on paper satellites since circum-
vention of regulations will undoubtedly occur.17 1 For example,
an operator can easily claim to have a satellite manufacture and
launch contract by simply including it as an option in a con-
tract. 1 72 Under the existing ITU, no regulatory agency or proce-
dure of review exists to account for these situations. 71
In addition, the administrations failed to require any
mandatory mediation or arbitration process. As the Final Re-
162 See infra notes 22-31 and accompanying text.
163 See infra notes 14-39.
164 See Final Report, supra note 50, at 14.




169 See infra notes 40-65 and accompanying text.
1711 See infra notes 127-40 and accompanying text.
171 See Christensen, supra note 46 (describing how, as a consultant, he is paid to
find ways to circumvent regulations for his clients).




port pointed out, amendments of this caliber could not be ade-
quately discussed and debated in four short weeks during the
conference. 174 In fact, it is questionable that a recommendation
of this sort will be acted upon at all. 175 Consequently, the admin-
istrations' ultimate failure may be their inability to deal directly
with the root of the paper satellite problem: empowering the
ITU.
VI. A MARKET DRIVEN APPROACH
A. EXPANDING ITU MEMBERSHIP
It is now obvious that an upgraded ITU, mindful of today's
economy, is required to solve the paper satellite problem. In
addition to the resolutions passed at WRC-97, this Comment
suggests a more efficient, market driven approach to enforcing
administrative and financial due diligence requirements. This
step is necessary in order for Resolution 18 to have a long term
impact on the problem of paper satellites.
Some suggest that allowing membership to International and
Regional Organizations may provide an answer to the paper sat-
ellite problem.1 76 This view presupposes that regional organiza-
tions will be better able to place checks upon its members and
resolve regional disputes.17 7 But this approach ignores increas-
ing rivalries between different regions for precious orbital
space. 17 Better yet, an efficient and long term solution to the
paper satellite problem lies with the satellite industry itself, in-
cluding the bankers who fund the projects and the insurance
companies that provide coverage against launch failure.
Some administrations have begun to recognize this view by
including satellite operators into their delegations. The U.S.,
for example, has included representatives from the satellite in-
174 See Final Report, supra note 50, at 20 (stating that changes to the Constitu-
tion should only be addressed at the Plenipotentiary Conference).
175 See id.
176 See Delzeit & Beal, supra note 14, at 82 (arguing satellite organizations
should be allowed into ITU to prevent individual nations from abusing spectrum
rights).
177 See id.
178 See Selding, Euro-US Scuffle, supra note 8, at 4, 26; see also Paul Kallender,
Interference Among Services Worries Japanese Delegates, SPACE NEWS, Oct. 27-Nov. 2,
1997, at 4. Japan sees U.S.-based Teledesic's proposal as a "big headache." Id. at
26.
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dustry to serve on its delegation to the WRC-97.1 79 The benefit
of having these members at policy-making conferences like
WRC-97 is that they can provide technical and market-wise ex-
pertise not available to "pure" state delegations.180 This is be-
cause an operator's motives are market driven rather than
political. However, giving only satellite operators a voice in the
ITU is not enough.
B. INVOLVING THE SATELLITE INDUSTRY IN THE ITU PROCESS
Currently, the ITU does not provide a means for direct in-
volvement by the private sector.' 8 ' In order for the ITU to be-
come a viable regulatory agency, it must leverage the expertise
of the operators, bankers, and insurers of the satellite indus-
try.'8 2 The only way to accomplish this is to admit these entities
into the ITU with limited capabilities. Thus, the ITU may con-
sult with these experts whenever need be. Furthermore, the pri-
vate sector would not be allowed to vote on the actual rules of
the ITU. This measure would protect against the formation of
cartels and collusive practices by the satellite industry. In addi-
tion, this solution provides several means to enforce the ITU's
regulations.
First, satellite operators depend on the financial institutions
to provide capital for their systems.' 8 3 By including them in the
ITU, they would be required to include financial due diligence
covenants into their loan agreements with the operator. Thus, if
179 See Shetty, supra note 2, at 5; see also Richard McCaffery, U.S. Firms Clamor for
Room for Next-Generation Systems, SPACE NEWS, Oct. 27-Nov. 2, 1997, at 26 ("The
FCC is part of the U.S. delegation to the WRC, which includes officials from
companies such as Motorola Inc., Schaumberg, Ill.; Teledesic Corp., Kirkland,
Wa.; and Leo One USA, St. Louis, Mo."); FCC's Ness Discusses Prioritiesfor WRC-97,
SATELLITE NEWS, Oct. 27, 1997, at 4 (FCC commissioner Ness discusses the in-
volvement of the U.S. satellite industry in preparation for WRC-97).
180 See Shetty, supra note 2, at 5 (describing the value of having industry repre-
sentatives at ITU policy making conferences).
18, See supra notes 13340 and accompanying text.
182 See Special Report, supra note 55, at 31. Some administrations are beginning
to call out for an expansion of the operator's role in the coordination process.
See id.; see also Increasing the Role of the System Operator in the ITU Intersystem
Coordination Process, Doc. USSC/7-E (June 25, 1996) <http:// www.itu.ch/
home/Search/> (examining the idea of expanding the role of operators to in-
clude dealing directly with the ITU, other Administrations, and conducting inter-
system coordination negotiations). But see Final Report, supra note 50, at 16
(concluding that an expansion of the operator's role should be done at the na-
tional level).
183 See Christensen, supra note 46 (stating that it is the banks who ultimately
determine if a system prevails or fails).
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certain financial milestones were not met to the satisfaction of
the institution, it could refuse to grant or continue funding.
This solution is economically prudent since it places the burden
of analyzing financial due diligence upon the real "experts."
Furthermore, this scheme treats low-cost and high-cost systems
alike since each must prove its own individual worth in order to
access capital. Accordingly, the RB would not accept a coordi-
nation request from an operator who does not first have the ap-
proval from its financial backer. This would limit the requests
submitted to only those who meet a pre-screening by the finan-
cial institutions.
Second, insurance companies can ensure that procedural due
diligence requirements are met once a system is filed. Due to
the high risk involved with satellite launches,'84 operators de-
pend greatly on the insurance company to hedge against risk.
By allowing insurance companies into the ITU, the insurance
companies would ensure that coordination is fully completed
before actual coverage on the satellite launch became effective.
Rather than submitting "progress reports" to the administration
or ITU, insurance companies would bear the burden of review-
ing procedural due diligence.
This responsibility would be in the best interest of the insur-
ance companies because it would allow them to review their pol-
icies based upon the periodic information submitted. Thus, if
an operator were not serious about launching a satellite, the in-
surance company would terminate its pre-launch insurance.
Without insurance to launch, financial institutions would easily
eliminate funding to the "paper" systems. In effect, an operator
would lose its rights if it did not possess the adequate "insur-
ance" necessary for operation of a system.
Third, dispute settlements may be resolved more quickly by
allowing operators with limited standing into the ITU. As a con-
dition of membership to the ITU, operators could agree to
binding mediation or arbitration administered by RRB commit-
184 SeeJames M. Gifford, Risky Business: Specialized Underwriters Cover the Risk of
Very Expensive Mishaps, SATELLITE COMM., Feb. 1, 1997, available in 1997 WL
9995660 (discussing the high risk, high yield nature of the satellite communica-
tions industry); see also Chris Bulloch, Insurers Take a Close Look at Satellite Perform-
ance, INTERAVIA Bus. & TECH., May 1, 1997, available in 1997 WL 10437597
(discussing the satellite communications insurance industry. See generally Julian
Hermida, Space Insurance: A Launch Provider's Perspective, AiR & SPACE LAW., Win-
ter 1997, at 14 ("Space insurance constitutes an effective mechanism to transfer
risks derived from the whole launch process, which starts with the construction
and ends with the deployment of the payload.").
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tees. These "dispute" committees would be composed of admin-
istration members from varying countries to eliminate potential
biases. In any case, the sovereignty of the nations would not be
affected since the outcome of these proceedings would have no
dispositive effect on an individual administration.
C. OTHER BENEFITS OF MARKET DRIVEN APPROACH
In addition, it is also likely that technological innovations
would eliminate many of the coordination disputes anyway.
New technology may provide a means to access an existing, but
unutilized, spectrum.'85 No matter what, more and more opera-
tors would find ways for their satellites to share the orbital plane
in order to avoid time consuming litigation and/or arbitration.
Finally, the private sector's expertise must be taken into con-
sideration when determining whether an international auction
would provide the most efficient means to distribute orbital
rights. If established, the ITU as a whole could create a forum
in which to administer the spectrum.'8 6 But the collection, stor-
age, and distribution of the funds would be handled by the fi-
nancial institutions since they are experts in this particular field.
Taken together, this market-driven approach would not elimi-
nate all paper satellites. In fact, this result is undesirable since
many new systems depend upon paper satellites to hedge
against operational risks.187 The ability to hedge against opera-
tional risk is an important factor for many innovative systems
which depend on numerous satellites for service.' 88
Notwithstanding this, however, a market driven approach
would place an effective check on the paper satellites which are
nothing more than speculative filings. In the end, the market
would weed out the "paper" ones with no economic significance
while allowing real systems to develop and launch. As a result,
this approach would provide a long term solution that nurtures
185 See Christensen, supra note 46, (describing the L-Band as being currently
unutilized but subject to use depending on ongoing technological innovations).
1 See Karl Kensinger, in Panel Discussion, supra note 1 (discussing the idea of
an international auction as being unattractive at this point because of issues aris-
ing out of handling of funds and administration of auction itself); see also Foley,
supra note 46, at 8. But in the first action of its kind, the FCC auctioned off one
position to MCI Communications Corp. for $ 600 million. See id.
187 See supra notes 155-57 and accompanying text.
188 See Chris Forrester, LEOS, GEOS, and MEOS, Will They all Fly?, VIA SATELLITE,
Oct. 1, 1997, at 19 (providing a comprehensive overview of the new satellite sys-
tems that will depend on numerous satellites to provide worldwide coverage).
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satellite industry expansion, while also leaving room for contin-
ued innovation.
VII. CONCLUSION
Deregulation of the telecommunications industry worldwide
has left the ITU's benevolent goals of equitable access and effi-
ciency at odds with each other. Competition has spurred fierce
rivalries between administrations for precious and limited orbi-
tal space. Satellite operators are no longer state-owned telecom
administrations. The ITU must embrace this market reality and
restructure its procedures and regulations accordingly.
Creative solutions to the paper satellite problem are only
available if operators, bankers, and insurers are given a voice in
the ITU's policy making process. The existing market condi-
tions of today require that industry experts be allowed into this
process. Although this modernized ITU would take some time
to coordinate, the market would require solutions to present it-
self as quickly and efficiently as possible. As a result, a viable
long term strategy to the paper satellite problem can only be
accomplished by the inclusion of the satellite industry itself.
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